War on the Rocks

You can't occupy territory with drones (yet). You will need people and moving people in a drone-infested environment will mean protecting them with armoured vehicles. Yes, these vehicles will need enhancements and other new tech to counter drones, but armoured vehicles aren't going away (MAYBE the tank's days are numbered, though). If you are really interested in this, I highly recommend subscribing to war on the rocks. Their articles and paid podcasts have legit defense industry people publishing studies on this subject. https://warontherocks.com

Apparently, nobody knows - not even analysts with lifetimes of Russia expertise. We’re in uncharted territory. War on the Rocks[1] generally, and any content featuring Michael Kofman[2] specifically, are great sources on the conflict generally. The ~weekly podcast is great. [1] https://warontherocks.com/ [2] https://mobile.twitter.com/KofmanMichael

What is the security competition between South Africa and the US that would justify such an analogy? China is peaceful recently, at least since their invasion of Vietnam. But (1) their post-Deng culture is highly militaristic and irredentist, (2) this is the first time in history that they actually can rollback US influence, their previous inability explains the peace rather than lack of will (3) Taiwan from a realist perspective makes too much sense, as the first in the island chain to wedge between Philippines and Japan, and its role in supplying chips to the US. The lesson we should learn from Russia's invasion of Ukraine is to believe countries when they say they own another country. Not assume the best and design policy around that assumption. If you want to read some experts on this question, see this: https://warontherocks.com/?s=taiwan The general consensus seems to be around a 20-25% chance of an invasion of Taiwan within the next 5 years. The remaining debate isn't about whether they want to do it, it's about whether they'll be able to do it and what their calculation will be around those relative capabilities.

I left the same comment on another thread about the Crimea attack: The war in Ukraine while tragic has been fascinating. I have curated a list of seemingly intelligent and informed open source intelligence (OSI) people on twitter that I have followed since early on. Most of them favor Ukraine and have been a bit optimistic. Still it is fascinating to follow a war in real time, with real reports. It is easy to see "the fog of war". An event will happen and a couple of weeks later you will understand that event in context. Ukraine has performed incredibly well in this war for being so outmatched. Russia has done poorly. The asymmetric warfare should make much of our military industrial complex quake in their boots. To my understanding, in addition to drones, sea drones (sea baby) and western military hardware, Ukraine has innovated with tactics and software. They have apparently developed advanced counter battery fire (firing at their howitzers) software that allows geographically dispersed units to coordinate. For this specific attack a couple of things are interesting. Over time Ukraine has eroded Russian anti aircraft batteries and radars, particularly in Crimea. This has forced Russia to either deploy more to Crimea or risk assets to slow moving missiles like this storm shadow attack. This attack was also well timed, happening late Christmas night at a period of presumably reduced readiness. My personal list of Ukraine twitter people…

I found this worthwhile read on the topic: https://warontherocks.com/carrier-strike-groups-should-be-ready-to-go-…

That article reads like typical NATO stuff which sounds great in practice but makes assumptions that don't exist, and are unobtainable (like air superiority), if you're fighting an enemy more sophisticated than guys running around in sandals with AKs. Here [1] is a report from somebody who worked with drones in Ukraine, and why he's exceptionally disillusioned with them. I half wonder if what I linked to wasn't an indirect response to what you posted, as it was published only 3 days later, and is essentially that article's equal but opposite. [1] - https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fp…

https://warontherocks.com/. Not a youtube channel but pretty good content.

I recommend this podcast with people from congress on the topic: https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/win-wind-how-a-bipartisan-ships-act-…

The Northern Sea Route has been contested for decades: https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/getting-sporty-in-russias-arctic/ The US is also upset that Russia had been making its own Arctic ECS claims through proper legal channels: > Russia has cleared the scientific burden of proof required to have its extended continental shelf claim legitimized. Decades of scientific research, Arctic missions, and information exchanges with Denmark and Canada have resulted in the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf dubbing the majority of Moscow’s claim to an extended Arctic continental shelf to be “valid.” https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-ra…

Indeed, it's a complex topic. I was reading an article just the other day on nuclear targeting strategy(1); the thought that goes into this and how it interacts with the greater warfighting strategy, or arms control agreements, is daunting. Suffice to say, the land-based fleet still has a role to play. Other powers still have or are expanding theirs(2). Arms control talks need to get back on track. But until then, a balance needs to be kept. As an aside, I read the book "Inventing Accuracy" a while back; a really interesting look at the technology that goes into missile guidance and how it drove policy and strategy. Great read(3) 1: https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-myths-about-counterforce/ 2: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/news/new-chinese-missile-silo-… 3: https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262631471/inventing-accuracy/

Not really. I meant that Balkan operation was nowhere even close in technological terms to the full-scale Russian invasion, supported by their most advanced air tech. > ... despite a world-class air force’s best effort against a second-rate defense, the United States never gained air supremacy. High-value intelligence platforms such as the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System were prohibited from flying over land where their sensors were most useful and instead had to stand off outside the threat region. (c) https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-dangerous-allure-of-the-no-fly-z…

Not at all. Modern war isn't some sort of battle royal with guns and tanks, it's more of a strategy and logistics problem. If you're interested in a window into modern military thinking that's accessible to laymen like you and me, I'd recommend checking out this article: https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-war-will-grind-on-reflecting-on-…

https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/not-their-plane-to-land-generals-thw… > Chris, Melanie, and Zack discuss Doyle Hodges’ recent article scrutinizing Gen. Mark Milley’s behavior in the waning months of the Trump administration. Journalists have rendered a relatively favorable treatment of Milley’s insubordination, but Hodges questions the long-term implications for civil-military relations. Should senior military officers be expected to follow lawful orders, even if they are morally objectionable? Or is resignation the only proper response when those in uniform cannot faithfully execute an order? And is the problem of civil-military relations unique to the Trump administration or does the Milley case portend a future in which the military’s standing is filtered through the same partisan lenses that inflict our politics across the board?

Whether Russia should be considered a “great power” at this point is questionable. (Though they are surely still a nuclear-weapons-armed state.) The Ukraine war has demonstrated that the Russian armed forces is barely capable of operating away from railheads. Their entire logistics system is based on rail, and they don’t have enough fuel trucks, general-purpose tactical trucks, engineering vehicles, etc. to keep their troops supplied and moving if they get too far (maybe 100–150 km at most) from the nearest railhead. They start running out of food, fuel, and ammo, and quickly get bogged down. This late-2021 analysis was prescient: https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-ru…

Your first example is really poor one (although this is not your fault) because there is nothing to indicate that this outcome was a factor in executive decision-making, as opposed to an unexpected outcome at ground level. Let me recommend this article as a cynical but in-depth examination of the political and military calculus surrounding the incident: https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-de…

Thanks for writing this so well. Without taking a stance on your post, let me also add: It is quite hard to have a fair discussion about this topic, because there is a significant amount of misinformation around. China Daily (state-sponsored) pushes in the US a lot of pro-China-regime sentiment. (Right now on their web page there's a hagiography of Xi). Epoch Times (Falun-Gong sponsored) appears to have gone all in for one party in the US, pushing daily misinformation and echoing lines from other countries attacking the West. My best guess at why Epoch Times has so much disinformation is because of feeling close to one group in the US due to christian identity, but I'm not fully sure. A good article on state-sponsored influence operations, with an emphasis on China, is here: https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/contrasting-chinas-russias-influence…

Best walkthrough I've seen of the intent element from a JAG: http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/why-intent-not-gross-negligence-is-th…

Do you have a source on that? Their article from a month before the invasion seems like the opposite of dismissal: https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/putins-wager-in-russias-standoff-wit… > A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping security outcomes there are all at stake. Beyond Europe, this conflict would have profound implications for U.S. defense strategy, and may upset America’s best-laid plans to focus on the eroding military balance with China. Ukraine, whose fate hangs in the balance, may be at the center of the crisis, but Moscow has a greater goal in mind: the revision of Europe’s security order. The Russian armed forces have conducted a substantial buildup around Ukraine, with Moscow threatening unilateral military measures if it is not able to achieve its goals at the negotiating table.

Ha, I love the "rescue ops". This will not primarily be for rescue ops. This will be for supporting Marine standin operations on and within the first island chain. The marines have been trying to figure out how they can handle sustainment and logistics in that environment. You can read some wonkish article about this (back in 2022) https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/sustainment-of-the-stand-in-force/ . You'll note that the article does suggest revisiting seaplanes as a distribution option. With a few hundred miles range, these craft would be suitable as one way island to island hoppers, or 2 way over the horizon ship to shore transports. For a sense of scale, its ~140 miles from Luzon to Scarborough Shoal (one of the contested islands in the South China Sea). The "Viceroy" craft that Regent has mocked up on their website claims 180 mile range, 3500lb of cargo / 2 crew + 12 passengers. EDIT: And to be clear, the article title says "to get", but the article makes clear, this is basically a testing and development contract. There's no certainty that the Marines will get this capability in any meaningful way. Probably better to replace with "to test". This is particularly important because the commercial version of this craft is also still in development and testing.

> Ukraine -- I would squarely put this on Russia, nothing to do with the U.S. Every kinetic reaction by Russia in Georgia and Ukraine is downstream of major destabilizing non-kinetic actions by the US. You don't think the US fomenting revolutions in Russia's near-abroad was in any way a contributing factor to Russian understanding of the strategic situation on its western border? [1] You don't think the US unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty[2], and then following that up with plans to put ABMs in Eastern Europe[3], were factors in the security stability of the region? You don't think that the US pushing to enlarge NATO without adjusting the CFE treaty to reflect the inclusion of new US allies had an impact? [4][5] It's long been known that the Russian military lacked the capacity for sustained offensive/expeditionary operations outside of its borders.[6][7] Until ~2014 it didn't even possess the force structure for peer warfare, as it had re-oriented its organization for counter-insurgency in the Caucasus. So what was driving US actions in Eastern Europe? This was a question US contrarians and politicians such as Pat Buchanan were asking as early as 1997. We've had almost 3 decades of American thinkers cautioning that pissing around in Russia's western underbelly would eventually trigger a catastrophic reaction[8], and here we are, with the Ukrainians paying the butcher's bill. In the absence of US actions, the kleptocrats in Moscow would have been quite content…

The greater problem is hostility to enforcement from the top down, as evidenced by countless scandals. Gender segregation "others" women and cripples their careers, ensuring that they continue to be underpromoted relative to their talent and thus underrepresented. We learned a long time ago that separate but equal is inherently unequal, yet it's a zombie concept that always comes back. https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/the-dark-side-of-gender-segregation-… > It may seem intuitive that gender segregation would lead to less sexual harassment and sexual assault, but there is mounting evidence that shows the opposite might be true. Studies on workplace sexual harassment show that encouraging social integration at work can reduce sexual harassment. Other studies show that increased contact with an “outgroup” (in this case, women), improves attitudes towards individuals in that outgroup. These improvements are more likely to take place when group membership is de-emphasized during the interaction. But we're hobbled in discussing this on HN because it skews overwhelmingly male — and there's even less enthusiasm for confronting that than there is for confronting sexual assault in the military.

I think it's premature to say it would be a step in the right direction, unless Mauritius publicly promises that they would immediately evict the US base (turning down the rent payments and weakening the presence of a strategic ally in the region). From what I've read: "Although Mauritius wishes to gain sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, its government, and that of its diplomatic supporter India, favor an American military presence there."[0] Also, the status of the British Indian Ocean Territory is not a clear historical wrong, or at least it's only wrong due to being a by-product of the original policy of colonialism. Legally speaking, "Council of Ministers [of Mauritius] confirmed agreement to the detachment of Chagos Archipelago"[1], so the objections to this policy are based on the fact that Mauritius was not fully independent from the UK at the time (and therefore under duress), and that a country can't legally be split in two unless both pieces agree (and no one asked the Chagossians specifically if they were happy with the arrangement). However, given the non-viability of the territory as a self-supporting entity, and assuming that Mauritius would not have wanted to support the unemployed population there after Britain closed the plantations, it's likely that much the same outcome would have happened even if all of our 21st century principles had been followed back in the 1960s. The only difference would have been that the Chagossians wouldn't have…

Lawfare blog, and especially its podcasts: https://www.lawfareblog.com/topic/podcasts Close second, "War on the Rocks" podcast: https://warontherocks.com/podcasts/ Lot of "National Security / Foreign politics" content has been a breath of fresh air, because while this is clearly biased toward an American viewpoint, there is an intellectual respect toward other peoples/states situation, objectives, and possibility of getting to those objective. In practice, that means that when talking about Putin, they debates around why Putin is doing that, and why Putin would be doing it that way, what are the possible outcomes, and how the US/NATO/other parties can try to act or react in a way that's beneficial for them. Another example: Lawfare where highly critical of the Trump administration, but they always approached their analysis by asking "What is his thought process" and "What is he gaining by doing that". Once you get used to hear a bunch of smart people articulating their thought in that way, it's painful to listen back to a discourse centered around "our good values vs. their bad intentions", which is unfortunately the norm. Totally different subject, but if one is interested in religions, I highly recommend the Youtube channels "Religion for Breakfast" and "Let's talk religion", who goes deep into a variety of subjects, while disclosing what is still contentious in the academic term, and try to be as unopinionated as possible.

This is war and ground lines of communication are a legitimate and important target. And the Crimea bridge is on the top of the list for the following reason: Russian military logistics is heavily dependent on railways, they were short on trucks even before the war. See, for example, this interesting article from War on the Rocks. [0] By losing the railway connection, Russian soldiers in Crimea and Kherson Oblast can no longer be reliably supplied with anything. Tanks, fuel, you name it. Provisionally, ferries can be used instead, but the ferry capacity is a fraction of what a double-tracked electrified railway can carry, plus the previously existing ferries between Russia and Crimea were discontinued and sold after the bridge was put in operation. The autumn and winter military operations have just grown a lot more problematic for the Russians. The only possible backup, a railway running to Donbas through southern Ukraine, is too close to the frontlines and likely to be cut by an Ukrainian offensive soon. [0] https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-ru…

I was worried about this earlier, so I spent some time searching this out. Here are some good analyses: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/23/little-military-sense-for-nuc… https://thezvi.substack.com/p/ukraine-post-12 https://www.iswresearch.org/2022/09/russian-offensive-campaign-assessm… The TL;DR is that most experts don't think Russia will use tactical nuclear weapons, but there's still a substantial non-zero chance. 10%? 25%? Much higher than anyone would like, that's for sure, and dependent on factors that are out of control of anybody but the Russian government and military. I have not found any sources saying the opposite, though some have higher degrees of confidence than others. The consensus appears to be that this sense of uncertainty is being created by Russia on purpose, and therefore, that it's probably (but not guaranteed to be) a bluff. I have also seen very mixed opinions on whether Russia's tactical nuclear weapons are in suitable condition for use. But I think it is best to assume they are. The odds of Russia intentionally using strategic nuclear weapons, the kind you would target at foreign cities across continents or oceans from you, remain nearly zero. Unlike tactical nuclear weapons, which have theoretical uses in ensuring one wins a conflict, strategic nuclear weapons remain a guarantee of mutual and probably worldwide destruction with no purpose except to deter would-be attackers. The only time I can…

In addition to military history visualized (mentioned by another commenter), I recommend: * The Chieftain: https://www.youtube.com/c/TheChieftainsHatch . He has a series on the development of Armored doctrine for various nations prior to WW2 which is a very interesting dive into what military doctrine is and how it is formed. * Battle Order https://www.youtube.com/c/BattleOrder covers how troops are organized and divided into squads/platoons/companies/battalions/etc in various countries and at various times. * If you are interested in World War 2, the World War 2 in real time series on YouTube is also fascinating: https://www.youtube.com/c/WorldWarTwo . * For getting the perspective of national security experts dealing with current events, I would take a look at https://warontherocks.com , which has a mix of articles and associated podcasts. The war on the rocks podcast has been doing weekly updates on the state of the war in Ukraine with Michael Kofman, director for the Russia Studies Program at CNA. I've found those very informative. * Arms Control Wonk (https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ ) the blog and podcast are interesting for looking at the military from the point of view of strategic stability. * https://acoup.blog/ is run by a professor of military history. He covers a variety of topics; he does several series analyzing the historical realism of video games and movies for example. But he also discusses some of the fundamentals of military theory, and tends to…

1) How is Ukraine (inspiring) able to fight Russia - superpower and hangon for this long? A: “In a fight between a bear and an alligator, it is the terrain which determines who wins.” – Jim Barksdale Parable explained: "Barksdale: Well, in the animal world, a bear is not going to whip an alligator in water. And an alligator isn’t going to whip a bear on dry land. So, it’s not just the fighter, it’s the terrain that they’re on..." https://hbr.org/2014/06/dont-play-with-dead-snakes-and-other-managemen… Russia is struggling, especially in the north, with adverse terrain. See also "Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics" [1] 2) How are they able to predict and shoot down Russian jets with precision? Ukraine started the war with some of the best antiaircraft missiles and some of the best fighter jets Russia produced. That has been augmented by both Russian-made MANPADS (Strela [2]) and US-made MANPADS (Stingers [3]). The aircraft have to fly low because they don't have (enough / many / any?) precision guided bombs so they have to fly low in order to drop bombs with any accuracy. That makes them vulnerable to MANPADS. There might also be some cuing hints coming from the AWACS planes orbiting in Poland. [1] https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-ru… [2]…

The US set a date for Philippine independence in 1915 (IIRC); it was originally sometime in 1942-44; it was delayed by WWII. I strongly recommend Earl "Pete" Ellis' article "The Bush Wars" which basically details the US Marine's counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines; it's very similar to modern COIN doctrine, I'm told. The article can be found in 21st Century Ellis, which also has his "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia"---the Marine's part of the plan for WWII in the Pacific. Here's parts: https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-bush-wars-ellis-on-america-fight… https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-bush-wars-ellis-on-population-ce… https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-bush-wars-ellis-on-intel-governa… But I still don't know what happened in Afghanistan. I have heard the complaint, "How can we plan for Phase IV when we're still trying to figure out Phase I-III?" but it was 20 years....

> Can you imagine, the government telling you to do something and then dragging you in front of a court after you do it :S The French agents were arrested by New Zealand, not France, and convicted in New Zealand. France also threw their weight around to avoid having their agents jailed for the term of their sentences, AFAIK. Beyond that, there's nothing wrong with holding responsible agents of the state who follow illegal orders (whether this was by French law, I can't speak to it). Many liberalized states, and particularly the militaries of those states, operate on the assumption that you must refuse to follow an illegal order. (Intelligence services, which caused the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, may have different rules, but fundamentally there's supposed to be a carve-out and an escalation process for addressing orders "beyond the rules"." An example from the United States: https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-disobey-an-order/

Re: the soft war, I think perhaps the biggest threat is the disinformation campaigns being run by various worldwide entities, including the Chinese. This is one of the best summaries I've seen about democratic governments as they contrast to 'soft' totatalitarian countries like Russia and China. This is why we all want to live in democracies. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/contrasting-chinas-russias-influence… The operational differences, for all their practical implications, may be less important than the simple recognition that Beijing and Moscow both approach influence operations and active measures as a normal way of doing business. The United States approaches covert action as something distinct from the routine business of foreign policy, requiring special authorities and oversight or legal arguments over whether Title 10 or Title 50 applies. This is simply not the case for the contemporary Chinese or Russian states. They still bear the hallmarks of their totalitarian and Leninist pasts.* I was going to comment on The Epoch Times and China Daily (two English language papers that are tools to run influence operations), but let's leave that one for another day and just recognize that we need real, honest, truth-seeking media to have a democracy, and democracies need to figure out how to deal with our new media environment that is penetrated by disinformation.