Modern War Institute

A 1:1 to 2:1 civilian to combatant ratio is reported by John Spencer, urban war researcher and chair at the Modern War Institute. Spencer has said it will take years of research to confirm this ratio and how it was achieved. He considers it important to understand because the typical ratio in urban wars, including wars the U.S. has prosecuted, exceeds 6 innocent civilians killed per enemy combatant killed. Some urban wars see 12 innocent civilians killed per combatant killed. I think all of these ratios are horrifying. A low ratio can't be considered either good or exculpatory, as to whether violations of international humanitarian law have occurred. Civilians always bear a disproportionate impact in all urban wars. The case studies that have been completed are worth reading. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/urban-warfare-project-…

The terrorists were only able to do so because mass-media news was live broadcasting everything on the air, and the terrorists holed up with hostages in the hotel were able to follow the blow-by-blow live. (edit: i.e. SatCom alone can't do much, if there is no verifiable on-ground intel. And in 2008, our mass-media supplied it in liberal quantities, through multiple camera angles and replays and blow-by-blow commentaries.) cf. Westpoint's Urban Warfare Project Case Study #16: Mumbai Terrorist Attacks: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-16-mumbai-t… > Maintaining communications with their handlers in Pakistan was critical for several reasons. First, the handlers were monitoring live Indian news broadcasts and social media feeds, so they could provide real-time instructions throughout the operation and thus afford the attackers the ability to react to developments outside their targets. > The communication also provided the attackers psychological support. > The handlers were able to encourage the young, inexperienced militants to maintain their resolve and continue killing civilians and security forces by reinforcing their religious and financial motivations. > During the operation, the handlers actively coached some of the attackers to continue shooting civilians and to hold positions against Indian security force responders.

It’s a good thing war never escalates, otherwise you’d have to take the artillery and rockets pointed at Seoul and NK’s nuclear weapons into account. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/why-north-koreas-artillery-threat-should-not… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruct…

> Lockheed Martin can, given peak rates seen in 2025, produce a new F-35 approximately every 36 hours Until we run out of materials https://mwi.westpoint.edu/minerals-magnets-and-military-capability-chi…

Also sulfur: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-chokepoint-we-missed-sulfur-hormuz-and-t…

I suspect rtp4me has the same view as Rayiner in this same subthread. These past interventions often didn't work out so well, so why would this one, is what they're asking. And I mean, fair point. I partially disagree, but it's a fair point. * https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43261035 That, and there might be a shift going on in the US back from Maritime power thinking to Continental power thinking. (An essay on the differences) https://mwi.westpoint.edu/when-maritime-and-continental-powers-collide…

I would imagine that Obama is quite happy with his presidential immunity for ordering the extrajudicial killing of an American citizen via drone strike[1]. [1] https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ten-years-after-the-al-awlaki-killing-a-reck…

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-law-of-armed-and-unmanned-conflict/ > As the Supreme Court concluded, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and Congress’s 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force—along with the president’s commander-in-chief authority under Article II of the Constitution—provides ample domestic legal authority to conduct military operations against al-Qaeda. tl;dr: We haven't been ignoring the Constitution for a very long time.

it says "may", and the social science seems to believe it is far from main reason people join islamist extremist groups – https://mwi.westpoint.edu/who-really-chooses-to-become-a-suicide-bombe… https://www.eip.org/why-do-people-join-terrorist-organisations/#:~:tex… As long as PA pays pension to terrorist families, UNRWA teachers teach math with "how many jews killed" and Iran and Qatar actively sponsor islamist terror, the society will remain the way it is now.

War happens for a variety of reasons, the relative strength of the parties involved is just one factor. Plenty of actors have attacked a clearly stronger party. I think this article does a decent job of outlining some of the reasons war can occur. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-five-reasons-wars-happen/

The reasons wars happen: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-five-reasons-wars-happen/

The Ukrainians were effective destroying Russian tanks using Javelins and NLaws and civilian drones for spotting. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/an-unerring-sense-of-locality-ukraine-and-th… >the Russian tank crews fell victim to roving bands of hidden Ukrainian light infantry armed with Javelin and NLAW ATGMs, as well as armed drones. Like the destruction waged by Egyptian and Syrian Sagger teams, these ambushes resulted in the widespread destruction of Russian tanks and contributed to Russia’s operational abandonment of its northern axis of advance. As a result, between February 2022 and March 2023, Russia lost 1,917 of what the International Institute for Strategic Estimate estimated to be a prewar total of 3,417 tanks in active service

> The countries that have provided military and economic aid and training are members of NATO ... So when you say "NATO funded, NATO trained army", you're vastly overstating the NATO-ness of the UA. No, sounds about right - if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck. NATO "members" are funding Ukraine and its military. NATO "members" are training Ukraine's military. NATO "members" are arming Ukraine's military. For me, that is indeed a "NATO funded, NATO trained" army. (And surely, Ukraine's political and military leadership aren't attending NATO summits and meets for the drinks they provide, are they now? - https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c29d03574zdo ). > This isn't a war that can be won militarily by either side. I disagree. If the west send their soldiers to fight alongside Ukrainians Russia can be defeated. But they won't. Otherwise, Russia is already winning militarily. Without NATO "member" funding, Ukraine doesn't have the economic or military capability to fight the Russians. That is a reality that remains unchanged. > Ukraine wins by surviving What does "surviving" mean to you? The moment the west stops its funds, Ukraine's economy will collapse. > Russia loses if Ukraine survives Russia has no problem with Ukraine's existence, as long as it remains a neutral State that doesn't undermine Russian security. > If, by treaty or exhaustion, the lines freeze where they are, then Ukraine has won and Russia has lost And do you really…

It's more or less a near direct do over of the original source from Westpoint Military Academy. The Chokepoint We Missed: Sulfur, Hormuz, and the Threats to Military Readiness https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-chokepoint-we-missed-sulfur-hormuz-and-t… It's reasonable to assume that a fuller version exists in which Morgan D. Bazilian and Macdonald Amoah lay out the background data which Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek et al have seen. Morgan D. Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy and professor at the Colorado School of Mines, with over thirty years of experience in global energy policy and investment. A former World Bank lead energy specialist and senior diplomat at the UN, he has held roles in the Irish government and advisory positions with the World Economic Forum and the International Energy Agency. A Fulbright fellow, he has published widely on energy security and international affairs. Macdonald Amoah is an independent researcher with interests across critical mineral supply chains, advanced manufacturing gaps, the industrial base, and geopolitical risks in the mining sector. Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek (PhD) is a US Air Force command pilot, nonresident research fellow at the US Naval War College, and senior fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. He is the most published active duty officer currently serving, with over 150 articles on…

It's fairly important to distinguish what kind of drones are we talking about [1]. Iran's using Group 3 drones. The GP is confusing Iran's neighbours not being ready to counter group 3 drones with the drones being inevitably effective. These drones are by necessity large and slow, because they need a lot of energy and aerodynamic efficiency to get their range. That means that they are vulnerable to cheap counters, which Ukraine is demonstrating very convincingly: even though Russia is now launching 800+-drone raids, the vast majority is shot down. Even when those drones do get through, they are extremely inefficient. It's not just that they can't carry a heavy or sophisticated payload (more complex warheads are more effective, but way more expensive), the extremely high attrition ratio forces the enemy to try to target way too many drones per aimpoint. Instead of serving a few hundred aimpoints, the 800-strong raid is forced to concentrate on just a few, otherwise most aimpoints will get no hits whatsoever. But also the only reason 800-strong raids can even be launched is Ukraine lacking the capability to interdict the launches. 800 group 3 drones have an enormous logistics and manufacturing tail, which a Western force would have no problem destroying way before the raid can be launched. For example, Iran in its current state can't launch such raids. So in practice Iran's neighbours would need to intercept only a handful of drones, which is hardly an insurmountable…

That's what happens when the unitary Executive and the Commerce Clause expand to devour the entire constitution. If we wanted to reduce the expansiveness of executive power (the Bush Doctrine), Obama was given the mandate to do it, but instead went out of his way to codify the practices which a lot of people thought had been illegal. To borrow from a similar claim: with the combination of the "Due Process" interpretation that backed the al-Awlaki killing (where Holder explained that due process was simply a term designating whatever process that they do, and could entirely occur in one's own head), and this judgement, Trump could have stood in the middle of 5th Avenue and shot somebody and could not be charged for it. So can Biden. ----- edit: Ten Years after the al-Awlaki Killing: A Reckoning for the United States’ Drones Wars Awaits https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ten-years-after-the-al-awlaki-killing-a-reck… > From the Magna Carta to the US Constitution, citizens have sought ways to protect themselves from the arbitrary exercise of sovereign power. The drone strike on al-Awlaki reversed this historical process with an executive process. From the so-called “Terror Tuesday” or “targeting Tuesday” meetings where President Obama personally approved targets for drone strikes to the drafting of the legal logic justifying the extrajudicial killing of an American citizen, the strike on al-Awlaki was the result of decision making…