Recorded Future

recordedfuture.com · Company blog · on HN since 2010

Recorded Future, a threat intelligence company, publishes research on cyber threats, state-backed hacking, extremist groups, and leaked or sold data.

What HN saysHN links it for threat research on nation-state actors and cybercrime; commenters also discuss the company's web analysis and its investors, including Google and the CIA.
63HN people shared it
18linked it in comments
54stories submitted
367story points
5 months agolast shared
2010people per year2026

Most-shared posts

  1. 1
    Recorded Future - Unlock The Predictive Power Of The Web
    6 people · 1 points · first shared 2010 · discussion on HN
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  3. 3
    Military Reaper Drone Documents Leaked on the Dark Web
    2 people · 16 points · first shared 2018 · 1 comments on HN
  4. 4
    How Al-Qaeda Uses Encryption Post-Snowden (Part 2)
    2 people · 11 points · first shared 2014 · discussion on HN
  5. 5
    How Al-Qaeda Uses Encryption Post-Snowden (Part 1)
    2 people · 4 points · first shared 2014 · 3 comments on HN
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  9. 9
    Thieves and Geeks: Russian and Chinese Hacking Communities
    1 people · 122 points · first shared 2018 · 6 comments on HN
  10. 10
    North Korea Is Not Crazy
    1 people · 90 points · first shared 2017 · 38 comments on HN
  11. 11
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  13. 13
    Are You a Target for Nation-State Propaganda?
    1 people · 5 points · first shared 2018 · 3 comments on HN
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  15. 15
    Introducing the world's first Temporal Analytics Engine
    1 people · 3 points · first shared 2010 · discussion on HN

What HN people wrote when they linked it

So you say Google is using a battery of hidden markov chains with classical or slightly novel algorithms? I could believe that, given the quality of the Google Predict results. Plus Google buying http://recordedfuture.com undermines that their Prediction algo's aren't top notch (mildly expressed).
edm0nd · 2025-10-30
RU cybercriminals pay bribes to RU law enforcement to stay out of trouble as well as bend the knee and work for GRU/KBG when called upon for various requests by them. then there is also the unspoken rule of "dont shit where you eat" aka RU/CIS based ransomware operators and hackers cant attack any companies in the CIS region. a good read, https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/dark-covenant-3-controlled-imp…
deanebarker · 2021-12-18
There was a company in my city that did something like this. They didn't survive. They crawled the data, but also had a services component to do something with the data. Like, they had contracts with pharma companies to search for indications that a page was selling counterfeit drugs. I'm not sure of the exact details of why they didn't make it. Also, I'm thinking about Recorded Future (https://www.recordedfuture.com). They do something like this -- again, the mechanics of scraping, and a services component for analysis.
wyck · 2012-12-16
Well there is also this company https://www.recordedfuture.com/ which has the CIA and Google as investors, like anything political the grey area covers a lot.
Emore · 2010-08-10
"Google Cred" sounds a lot like what Recorded Future is up to (a company which, it turns out, Google has invested in). https://www.recordedfuture.com/
dirtyid · 2019-09-18
I hope this isn't an endorsement of serpentza or laowhy86, bitter expats with middle school mandarin proficiency flunking out of China are not insightful sources. There are millions of Chinese diaspora who lived in both Chinese and western cultures with much more useful things to say. Here are recent studies on how domestic and foreign Chinese propaganda works. How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument https://datasociety.net/events/databite-no-94-jennifer-pan/ Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/ Overlapping findings of both reports is that Chinese propaganda focus on overwhelmingly positive, benign messaging i.e. it placates and downplays instead of argue, attack or antagonize. Both also suggest 50c doesn't operate outside of China. Again, I wouldn't be surprised if Chinese foreign influence has expanded. I hope it would at least be closer to meme-able Baghdad Bob than whatever low-effort campaign that twitter alleges.
bigfatkitten · 2025-03-01
Just be careful how you use AI generated headshots. If you use it in your CV or LinkedIn profile, it's a red flag. https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/inside-the-scam-north-koreas-i…
shagie · 2023-10-04
Tangentially related: My Chromecast Ultra would not start until I began answering 8.8.8.8 --- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19170671 (2019; 509 comments) The original post for that is https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/WCVv57IizUSjNb2RQNP84fBclI… from Paul Vixie Also: An Internet Born In a Threat-Free Environment - https://www.recordedfuture.com/podcast-episode-201 (2021) Paul Vixie and Peter Lowe on Why DoH is Politically Motivated - https://www.dnsfilter.com/blog/paul-vixie-and-peter-lowe-on-why-doh-is… (also from 2021)
commoner · 2021-12-22
The submitted link doesn't work for me, but I found these links which do: - Report: https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinas-narrative-war-democracy/ - Summary: https://therecord.media/report-beijing-unleashed-a-massive-propaganda-…
deoxykev · 2020-02-02
Looks like it primarily comes from two ASN's in Brazil: CLARO S.A. (AS28573) and TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A (AS18881). Interestingly, it looks like Brazil is right up there with Russia when it comes to total number of risky ASN's. source: https://www.recordedfuture.com/asn-blocklist-analysis/
Scoundreller · 2017-05-15
A cursory analysis of the bitcoin addresses for this malware suggests that sending US$300 in BTC can be difficult. I see sends of US$178, US$189, US$332, US$280, US$362, US$220, etc. Possibly the amount is negotiable, or the amount to pay is different across different geographies. (edit: Looks like this exists, based on the Economist's Big Mac Index: https://www.recordedfuture.com/fatboy-ransomware-analysis/ )
abhv · 2014-08-01
The actual report is now linked here: https://www.recordedfuture.com/al-qaeda-encryption-technology-part-2/ First point: AlQ is now using well-studied encryption algorithms (possibly in the correct way, but not investigated in this story) Second point: Some claim about the software not being malware. Could not deduce the technical point they want to make here. But it is an embarrassing analysis that DOES NOT support their headline-seeking claim.
d0ne · 2011-05-24
Google is "good"? http://www.schneier.com/essay-306.html http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/technology/google_cnet/ https://www.recordedfuture.com/ ( Google and In-Q-Tel both major investors ) http://thestockmarketwatch.com/stock-market-news/recent-events/google-… http://xsreviews.co.uk/2011/05/google-to-lose-500m-to-antitrust-cases/ Could keep going for a while. My point is simple: It is easy to forget the "bad" when everyone focuses on the "good"
kalleboo · 2018-07-08
Apparently enough phishers/spammers are actually dumb enough to not use whoisguard https://www.recordedfuture.com/whois-gdpr-icann/ The reason that security researchers have had success with using WHOIS data is twofold. The first is that many attackers, even sophisticated attackers, have had poor OPSEC (operational security) when it comes to registering domains. A surprisingly large number of attackers simply didn’t bother to take steps to hide their identity or create unique, fake aliases when registering domains. Spammers were notoriously bad at hiding their identity, making it easy to identify newly registered domains as belonging to a known spammer and immediately adding it to block lists and real-time blackhole lists (RBLs). Secondly, even attackers who realized their mistake and changed the WHOIS information of their domains after the fact, or added privacy services to the domain, were out of luck because certain companies, such as DomainTools, keep track of historical WHOIS data, and researchers could easily see the original WHOIS information.
zwp · 2021-01-12
Washington Post attributed the attack to Russian actor APT29/Cozy Bear on Dec 14th [1], quoting unnamed sources. FireEye [2] Dec 13th & Volexity [3] Dec 14th were more cautious, citing an unknown actor that they dubbed UNC2452, and Dark Halo, respectively. Recorded Future made a fair but ultimately inconclusive case for Chinese attribution [4], Dec 30th. US gov/CISA continues to claim "Russian linked" [5], Jan 5th. Kaspersky reported a link to the Kazuar malware used by Russian actor Turla [6], Jan 11th. CrowdStrike's report on the malware injector [7], Jan 11th says "does not attribute the SUNSPOT implant, SUNBURST backdoor or TEARDROP post-exploitation tool to any known adversary". [1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-sp… [2] https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-… [3] https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwind… [4] https://www.recordedfuture.com/solarwinds-attribution/ [5] https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-in… [6] https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/ [7]…

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