SafeDep Blog
safedep.io · Company blog · on HN since 2023
SafeDep's security team analyzes npm and GitHub supply chain attacks, compromised packages, and malware in open source dependencies.
What HN saysCommenters link its write-ups during npm compromises such as keyv, saying they hold detailed analysis and steps for checking and cleaning up affected systems.
26HN people shared it
8linked it in comments
46stories submitted
140story points
2 months agolast shared
2023people per year2026
Most-shared posts
- 1Megalodon: Mass GitHub Repo Backdooring via CI Workflows3 people · 10 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 2ESLint-Config-Prettier Compromised3 people · 10 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 3Mass NPM Supply Chain Attack Hits TanStack, Mistral AI, and 170 Packages3 people · 4 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 4Miasma Worm Targets AI Coding Agents via GitHub Repos3 people · 3 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 5NPM's keyv package got compromised having 127M weekly downloads3 people · 2 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 6Dynamic Malware Analysis of Open Source Packages at Scale2 people · 8 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 7Axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 Compromised via Stolen Maintainer Account on NPM2 people · 7 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 8Tensorflow.js Typosquatting Attack: Malicious Package Targeting AI/ML Developers2 people · 3 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 9Config Files That Run Code: Supply Chain Security Blindspot2 people · 3 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 10Team PCP Strikes again – `telnyx` on PyPI gets compromised2 people · 2 points · first shared 2026 · 1 comments on HN
- 11Show HN: Gitlab CI Component for Vet – Protect CI Pipelines from Vulnerable OSS2 people · 1 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 12Red Hat Cloud Services Publish Pipeline Compromised, Shipped Malicious NPM2 people · 1 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 13Malicious Litellm 1.82.8: Credential Theft and Persistent Backdoor2 people · 1 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 14Malicious Rust Crate Arrayref Runs a Build-Time Payload1 people · 43 points · first shared 2026 · 9 comments on HN
- 15Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised1 people · 5 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
What HN people wrote when they linked it
nhecker · 2026-06-05
https://safedep.io/miasma-worm-ai-coding-agent-config-injection/ seems to describe the same symptoms, for what it's worth.
knlsn · 2025-09-27
For GitHub Actions, i found http://safedep.io/ to be helpful, not only it guard against known attacks, but also it has its own malware detection engine.
tgv · 2026-08-04
I got the news via https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/
byutifu · 2026-08-04
This article has a lot of information and ways to check & clean: https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/
Sudhanshu2310 · 2026-06-01
We have done the complete analysis and there are 32 packages share the same publishing pipeline.
https://safedep.io/redhat-cloud-services-hit-by-mini-shai-hulud-npm-wo…
sheept · 2026-04-03
This article[0] investigated the payload. It's a RAT, so it's capable of executing whatever shell commands it receives, instead of just stealing credentials.
[0]: https://safedep.io/axios-npm-supply-chain-compromise/
abhisek · 2026-03-24
We just analysed the payload. Technical details here: https://safedep.io/malicious-litellm-1-82-8-analysis/
We are looking at similar attack vectors (pth injection), signatures etc. in other PyPI packages that we know of.
Tangurena2 · 2026-06-09
Many of the malicious commits show as an author `github-actions <[email protected]>`. Which means that they are authenticating as internal github CI/CD stuff and that there are so many of those that no possible automated tool can find the poison in the mountain of chaff.
So this is related to the Sept 2025 security breach of Github.
> The five repos carry 1,459 GitHub stars between them, mantine-datatable alone accounting for 1,225. Stars are a rough proxy for how many developers have the source checked out locally, which is the population this attack targets.
> Every commit: unsigned, github-actions identity, chore: update dependencies [skip ci], the same six-file footprint. A 49-second sweep across five repos is automation, not a human committing. This matches Shai-Hulud self-propagation: harvest a GitHub token with write access from a prior infection, then push the persistence payload into every repo the token can reach.
https://safedep.io/miasma-worm-ai-coding-agent-config-injection/
What it is doing:
https://safedep.io/config-files-that-run-code/
I'm not related to those guys. That's the simplest detailed explanation of what is happening that I've found.