Oligo Security Blog
oligo.security · Company blog · on HN since 2023
Oligo Security's company blog reports on vulnerabilities such as AirPlay, MCP Inspector, sudo and OpenSSH flaws, and on runtime security.
What HN saysHN links it for research like the AirBorne AirPlay exploits and the 0.0.0.0 Day browser issue, with commenters citing it for specific CVEs.
15HN people shared it
5linked it in comments
15stories submitted
180story points
6 months agolast shared
2023people per year2026
Most-shared posts
- 10.0.0.0 Day: Exploiting Localhost APIs from the Browser7 people · 32 points · first shared 2024 · 8 comments on HN
- 2Critical RCE Vulnerability in Anthropic MCP Inspector – CVE-2025-495962 people · 5 points · first shared 2025 · 1 comments on HN
- 3AirBorne: Wormable zero-click remote code execution (RCE) in AirPlay protocol1 people · 130 points · first shared 2025 · 21 comments on HN
- 4What Is ADR (Application Detection and Response)?1 people · 3 points · first shared 2024 · discussion on HN
- 5First targeted campaign against AI infrastructure found in wild1 people · 3 points · first shared 2024 · 1 comments on HN
- 6Critical RCE Vulnerability in OpenSSH (CVE-2024-6387) – The Full Playbook1 people · 2 points · first shared 2024 · discussion on HN
- 7NIST's NVD Changes: A Wake-Up Call for CVE-Driven Security1 people · 2 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 8ShellTorch: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in PyTorch Model Server (CVSS 9.8)1 people · 1 points · first shared 2023 · discussion on HN
- 9The Future of Cloud Security Is Runtime1 people · 1 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 10New Vulnerabilities in IBM WebSphere Liberty Can Lead to Full Server Compromise1 people · 1 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 11New sudo vulnerabilities cve 2025 32462 and cve 2025 324631 people · first shared 2025
- 12Teampcp campaign the evolution of modern supply chain attacks1 people · first shared 2026
What HN people wrote when they linked it
ryoshoe · 2026-05-15
I found these references to Mullvad and TeamPCP
>The whole operation ran primarily from Mullvad VPN exit nodes and virtual private server infrastructure, with little effort made to blend in. This was a high-tempo, low-stealth campaign designed to extract as much value as possible, as fast as possible.[1]
>Wiz CIRT observed the bulk of TeamPCP’s activity originating from Mullvad Virtual Private Network (VPN) exit nodes and virtual private server hosts such as InterServer.[2]
1: https://www.oligo.security/blog/teampcp-campaign-the-evolution-of-mode…
2: https://www.wiz.io/blog/tracking-teampcp-investigating-post-compromise…
mmastrac · 2025-11-25
sudo is not fully battle tested, even today. You just don't really see the CVEs getting press.
https://www.oligo.security/blog/new-sudo-vulnerabilities-cve-2025-3246…
rvz · 2025-07-11
This does not make any sense whatsoever.
> The new MCP server runs directly on the user’s machine. That local first design means sensitive data does not have to travel to the cloud just to be useful.
Even if it is 'local', data can still be exfiltrated via prompt injection, even via Anthropic's MCP inspector which that was run 'locally' and was exploitable via going to a crafted URL link that points locally to the MCP server. [0]
Again, the concept of MCPs are totally incompatible with security.
[0] https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropi…
throw0101a · 2025-04-29
Post by the security researchers themselves:
* https://www.oligo.security/blog/airborne
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43832084
CVE-2025-24252 and CVE-2025-24132 are two examples. Doing a search for "Oligo" in release notes gives various other results, e.g.,
* https://support.apple.com/en-ca/122374