I
Information Arbitrage
informationarbitrage.com · Personal blog · on HN since 2007
A venture investor and former founder writes about startups, venture funding, and lessons from his failed company Monitor110.
What HN saysHN links it mainly for the Monitor110 post-mortem on a failed startup, and it appears on commenters' lists of entrepreneurship blogs.
55HN people shared it
5linked it in comments
94stories submitted
393story points
13 years agolast shared
2007people per year2026
Most-shared posts
- 1Failing well2 people · 27 points · first shared 2011 · 3 comments on HN
- 2Froth or famine?2 people · 7 points · first shared 2011 · discussion on HN
- 3Information Arbitrage: Thoughts on Taking Venture Money2 people · 6 points · first shared 2009 · discussion on HN
- 4Too many start-ups or too few venture dollars?2 people · 4 points · first shared 2011 · 1 comments on HN
- 5In search of Corporation 2.02 people · 3 points · first shared 2010 · discussion on HN
- 6Monitor110: A Post Mortem2 people · 1 points · first shared 2008 · discussion on HN
- 7Information Arbitrage: How I Invest1 people · 28 points · first shared 2009 · 13 comments on HN
- 8Monitor110: A Post Mortem- Turning Failure Into Learning1 people · 25 points · first shared 2008 · 2 comments on HN
- 9Advice to CTO Founders: Don't Let Business Kill the Business1 people · 22 points · first shared 2010 · 1 comments on HN
- 10Sometimes A Founder Needs To Let Go1 people · 21 points · first shared 2012 · 1 comments on HN
- 11The Challenge of Being Google1 people · 20 points · first shared 2010 · 1 comments on HN
- 12Start Fund: No big deal. Business as usual.1 people · 18 points · first shared 2011 · 1 comments on HN
- 13Switching to Disqus has been a "life-transforming experience"1 people · 16 points · first shared 2008 · 19 comments on HN
- 14Roger Ehrenberg: An open-source approach toward bond analytics1 people · 15 points · first shared 2010 · 3 comments on HN
- 15The Role of UI/UX in the Big Data Revolution1 people · 12 points · first shared 2011 · discussion on HN
What HN people wrote when they linked it
xg · 2008-03-18
Other people did a good job explaining the basics. The issue is about book value and the complexity of the risk. The risk is similar to what the firm Citadel did with E*Trade.
The risk on the books of Bear Stearns can't be fully calculated and JP Morgan is assuming that risk, hence the low price. The Fed is possibly going to limit the downside risk of JP Morgan to keep stability in US financial markets, though they are not putting up any additional capital upfront.
Roger Ehrenberg has some great blog posts on the topic (he used to run a big hedgefund and now has an NYC startup called Monitor110):
http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2008/03/the-bear-facts.html
http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2008/03/i-bear-ly-knew.html
vrikhter · 2011-09-04
Entrepreneurship:
http://cdixon.org/
http://derekandersen.me/
http://davidcummings.org/
http://viniciusvacanti.com/
http://www.steveblank.com/
http://37signals.com/svn
Startup/Tech Marketing:
http://www.responsys.com/blogs/nsm/
http://startup-marketing.com/
http://blog.kissmetrics.com/
http://unbounce.com/blog/
Venture Capital:
http://bhorowitz.com/
http://www.bothsidesofthetable.com/
http://www.feld.com/wp/
http://www.avc.com/
http://vcinjerusalem.typepad.com/vcinjerusalem/
http://sixkidsandafulltimejob.blogspot.com/
http://redeye.firstround.com/
http://informationarbitrage.com/
brianobush · 2008-12-17
This company is from the guy who started/funded monitor110.com - which ultimately failed. Interesting post-mortem found here:
http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2008/07/monitor110-a-po.html
Seven deadly sins of a startup:
1. The lack of a single, "the buck stops here" leader until too late in the game
2. No separation between the technology organization and the product organization
3. Too much PR, too early
4. Too much money
5. Not close enough to the customer
6. Slow to adapt to market reality
7. Disagreement on strategy both within the Company and with the Board
cs702 · 2012-06-28
I'm not too surprised losses from this trade have continued to grow, because whenever such trades become public, other Wall Street firms tend to gang up on the other side of the trade, putting themselves in a position where they can demand growing exit costs from the party that is suffering the losses.
Moreover, when the instruments being traded are thinly traded or illiquid (as is the case here), the ability of other firms to inflict pain on the losing party is magnified. In the worst case, this can force the losing party into "sell what you can, not what you should" mode, possibly leading not just to firm failure but also turbulence in other seemingly unrelated markets.
No one knows with certainty how this situation will evolve, but many seasoned Wall-Streeters have been expecting JPMorgan Chase to announce growing losses for months -- for example, see http://informationarbitrage.com/post/23227611033/ltcm-amaranth-jp-morg…