Matt Blaze

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Matt Blaze is a really excellent person, and this is a research focus area for him. For more in the same vein, try "The Eavesdropper's Dilemma" (http://www.crypto.com/papers/internet-tap.pdf). This paper is dear to me for reasons obvious to those who worked with me in the 1990s.

A good starting place to think about the CALEA system (besides, as other comments mention, looking at CALEA itself) is this paper from Matt Blaze and his students: http://www.crypto.com/blog/calea_weaknesses/ Also interesting is Steve Bellovin et al.'s excellent report on security implications of extending CALEA to VoIP: https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/CALEAVOIPreport.pdf Steve Bellovin is now the FTC's Chief Technologist and spends his days trying to bring technical sanity to the government in various ways.

Also, if you are interested in actual master keys, Matt Blaze's paper on the subject is a classic: http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html "n a recent research paper, we describe weaknesses in most master-keyed lock systems, such as those used by offices, schools, and businesses as well as by some residential facilities (particularly apartment complexes, dormitories, and condominiums). These weaknesses allow anyone with access to the key to a single lock to create easily the "master" key that opens every lock in the entire system. Creating such a key requires little skill, leaves behind no evidence, and does not entail engaging in recognizably suspicious behavior. The only materials required are a metal file and a small number of blank keys, which for many locks are readily available."

Worth reading but the highlight is the slides he sends to organisers "when pressed hard": http://www.crypto.com/papers/rsa2011-blaze.pdf

I have a crypto.com account and, if other exchanges are like them, I swear the goal is to make it difficult to take money out of the system. I have a less popular coin that I mined (<$2k worth) and the ability to transfer my coins to crypto.com so I can cash out for real money has been "coming soon" for over 6 months. Of course it's super easy to buy and there are no barriers in terms of cost if you want to bring money into the system, but even transferring out of the exchange to another crypto wallet is ridiculous. I bought some ETH hoping to try out ENS. At the time it was .008 ETH to transfer my money to a different ETH wallet. Now that's $35. How is crypto revolutionary again? Would you stay with a bank that charged you $25 to transfer your money to another bank? And the icing on the cake? I just went to the crypto.com fee list [1] and I can't even figure out how much it costs to transfer ETH to ETH now. They changed the way it works so it's not obvious. I think it needs to happen on a different chain or something. Who knows. Can anyone explain how it works? Can anyone explain how crypto currency is supposed to change the world if they can't even transfer my money around, for a reasonable price, with an easy to understand system? 1. https://crypto.com/exchange/document/fees-limits

Really? Stable-coins as a concept have existed for years, and in practice have blown up in trading volume and circulation the past 2 years. USDC stable-coin [0]($34 Billion in circulation) is arguably the most trustworthy in terms of having a 1 to 1 exchangeable backing through a regulated centralized custodian (Circle/Coinbase primarily but also BlockFi and other entities that hold USD reserves for exchange). Many of these entities (as well as "DeFi" decentralized finance platforms that use Ethereum or similar smart contracts to decentralize the process) allow for various forms of deposit and lending accounts that provide a whole range of yields way way above traditional banking deposits. On top of this, some of these custodians add an additional layer of payment ability to these deposit accounts. Crypto.com[1] for example has a Visa debit card that ties into your USDC/stable coin deposits that you can transact from, in theory avoiding needing to use fiat at all. As well as "CD-like" 3-month lockups where you can get 8-12% yield. There are also many decentralized stable coins that have various forms of over-collateralized crypto-asset reserves backing the coin and algorithms to stabilize the value by buying or selling from these reserves, trading off possible volatility and uncertainty around peg to avoid centralization and KYC and other regulations of 1:1 backed coins.[2] [0] https://www.circle.com/en/usdc [1] https://crypto.com/us/earn [2] $MIM dollar stable-coin:…

If you think we are pretty good at encryption, I'm worried that you're not paying attention. Matt Green captures the spirit of what a lot of us feel who are on the front lines of infosec defense: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/709919895002042368 "We can barely encrypt." This problem is not new. Put some time in and read Matt Blaze's paper "Why (Special Agent) Johnny (still) can't encrypt." http://www.crypto.com/papers/p25sec.pdf >>Also, as far as 'showing you a way' ... My point is apparently poorly made, so let me try improving. Encryption is a feature- but our ability to properly implement it is woefully inadequate. Many developers think very much like you seem to be- I have a secret, so I need to encrypt. But they forget about (or have no awareness of ) offensive methods for intercepting a secret with a debugger. They think in terms of network transport or file system objects. So many a developer says "I'll just take out my copy of applied cryptography and go to work." And then security experts get more fuel for yelling about the danger of rolling your own crypto (even if you're just implementing what you see in Applied Crypto). Finally- I was obviously not talking about conditional statements. Read it again and pay attention. Hypothetical "if only" scenarios are great and amusing way to burn brain cycles with no real application. It is also a tactical error, because it indulges people in considering things that don't exist as potentially…

Except that the traditional banking sector does much more than cryptocurrencies do. Bitcoin still runs only around 5-7 transactions per seconds - several orders of magnitude less than Visa alone. https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/charts/transactions-per-second https://crypto.com/en/university/blockchain-scalability

8%? Nexo's was promising 16% APR as recently as Nov 11 according to Google's cache (https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eN2KEVZClXgJ:htt… The page redirects to the home page now. I've seen "bonus" APRs as high as 40% offered. https://crypto.com/us/earn is still offering 14.5% APR, and 8.5% on stablecoins, after accidentally sending $400M to a competitor.

They use it to increase their reach, if you close TikTok, they'll still share on their main platforms; wich TikTok isn't Do your research Here for example: https://crypto.com/nft/brands/ufc When it is this mainstream, you can't say "oh it's because of TikTok", no, it's because of Western companies and celebrities promoting it, and using various mediums of communication; no legislation, no nothing

I have always wondered about the economics of these massive marketing campaigns. Take crypto.com for example: > Crypto.com buying the naming rights to the L.A. Lakers’ home arena for $700 million I guess they hope people see the stadium name and go use their site, right? crypto.com makes their money from trading fees. Let's take their most expensive fee of 0.4%[1]. $700M ÷ 0.4% = $175B. They would need to do $175 billion in trading volume just to make their money back. That's not happening any time soon. Do these companies even care about ROI? [1]: https://crypto.com/exchange/document/fees-limits

What would people choose UST over USDC? https://crypto.com/us/earn I'll know the crypto rush is over when you can't "stake" for 10% anymore.

Sure, For example crypto.com offers 12% pa. on your USD account. https://crypto.com/eea/earn P/E just like normal company ...

> You can pretty much live off of bitcoin tbh. Or at least you can spend it in a lot of places. > - https://www.bitrefill.com/ Buying gift cards is the same as cashing out but worse in every way. Pre-converting to a limited-use intermediate currency and then spending that intermediate currency isn't the same as spending bitcoin. > - https://crypto.com/cards I notice that their "stake" requirements are listed in USD, not CRO, and that this runs through both Visa and Metropolitan Commercial Bank to do centralized back-end conversions into and out of their bespoke coin. It sounds a lot like the blockchain aspect adds literally nothing to the equation and is just there to ride the buzzword FOMO zeitgeist. > - https://foldapp.com/ Same as ^ but with a different centralized backend bank and a different bespoke coin that adds literally nothing to the equation.

You can pretty much live off of bitcoin tbh. Or at least you can spend it in a lot of places. - https://www.bitrefill.com/ - https://foldapp.com/ - https://crypto.com/cards

defi is not far from replacing your^W my consumer bank - stablecoin - high apr savings account by lending to defi leverage pool - crypto.com visa card for real world offramp https://crypto.com/us/cards I'm a founder and my cost of living is $40k/yr post-tax cashflow mediated by wells fargo checking + credit card. I think it just became possible to get wells fargo out of my life!

It was gwei but this site never made it apparent https://crypto.com/defi/dashboard/gas-fees And prices, in USD,were higher when I posted my statement earlier.

The money is returned back to the donors (modulo gas fees which is currently at $100-$200 range [1]). 1: https://crypto.com/defi/dashboard/gas-fees

Scrolling through https://crypto.com/nft is like scrolling through https://www.deviantart.com ... except the themes in the NFT art are often related to wealth, there are crypto logos all over the place and the NFTs are MUCH more expensive than DeviantArt.

It is linked to a cryptocurrency called Loki. https://crypto.com/price/loki

> No, they are literally using it They are not. They're offering a pre-paid card that users can top up with their crypto.com wallets. [1] The Crypto.com Visa Card is a prepaid card. Broadly speaking, prepaid cards are the same as debit cards. The difference is that debit cards are linked to your bank account, but prepaid cards need to be topped up. In our case, you can top up using bank account transfers, other credit/debit cards, or cryptocurrency. And Deutsch Telecom isn't using a blockchain either. They're selling data to a company that then puts the data on a blockchain. That's not using a blockchain. [1] https://crypto.com/cards

Here's a paper with the specific details of why P25 has troubles with reliability while encrypted: http://www.crypto.com/papers/p25sec.pdf "Because of the above-described property of the error correction mechanisms used, especially in voice frames such as the LDU1 and LDU2 frame types, there is no mechanism to detect errors in certain portions of transmitted frames. This was a deliberate design choice, to permit undetected corruption of portions of the frame that are less important for intelligibility."

Matt Blaze opened up a Bramah lock in 2003. http://www.crypto.com/photos/misc/bramah/

This link explains how the lock worked and discusses picking techniques, though not Hobbs' methods specifically. I vaguely remember reading that his equipment included a device to apply a small torque to the cylinder, via a lever arm with a short pendulum on its end. Any movement of the cylinder as a slot aligned with the shear line ring was revealed by the swinging of the pendulum. The use of shallow decoy slots indicate that Bramah had anticipated this form of attack, but they only served to delay the solution. http://crypto.com/photos/misc/bramah/

This is what happened the last time AT&T tried to work with the government to create a backdoor into encryption software. http://www.crypto.com/papers/eesproto.pdf Maybe they aren't fighting backdoor legislation because they have another contract with the government...

Matt Blaze developed a very cool attack against master-key lock systems: http://www.crypto.com/papers/mk.pdf It requires access to one (non-master) key as well as a lock which is open-able by that key. It also requires being able to generate a modest number of new keys with a key cutter (however significantly fewer than brute forcing the entire space). IIRC, the attack boils down to: - Start with the known non-master key - Hold all but one of the teeth constant, and try different values of that one tooth until you get a different working key. This other value must be the master key's value. - Repeat until you have the master value for each tooth. If TSA locks work the same way as the locks described in this paper, a single lock/key seems sufficient to generate the master key.

How can an ordinary person tell if one of these spy planes is currently overhead? Is there some way to dink with them, similar to Matt Blaze's in-band signalling vulnerabilities discovery(s) (http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretap.pdf) ? You know, use old phones that still have SIM cards, but have them try to register constantly? I'm a bit vague on cellphone protocol details, so spare me the nit picking, and get on with the revelations.

Very Relevant: http://www.crypto.com/papers/export.txt (current Penn professor Matt Blaze's mid-90s account of registering as an arms dealer with US Customs to transport an encrypted telephone to Europe)

This is a scan of his temporary export license: http://www.crypto.com/private/exportlic-scan.pdf