RubyGems Blog
blog.rubygems.org · Company blog · on HN since 2012
The official blog of RubyGems and Bundler, covering security advisories, infrastructure changes, and package registry policy.
What HN saysCommenters link it for security advisories and new features like dependency cooldowns, and one praises the pace of fixes and improvements.
48HN people shared it
12linked it in comments
45stories submitted
864story points
3 months agolast shared
2012people per year2026
Most-shared posts
- 1CVE-2015-3900 Request Hijacking Vulnerability in RubyGems 2.4.6 and Earlier3 people · 3 points · first shared 2015 · discussion on HN
- 2Permadelete on yank3 people · first shared 2016
- 3How RubyGems.org protects OSS infrastructure2 people · 157 points · first shared 2025 · 35 comments on HN
- 4Rubygems.org: Simplifying our stack2 people · 9 points · first shared 2016 · discussion on HN
- 5Dealing with (Hypothetical) Sham Ruby Packages2 people · 6 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 6RubyGems: data verification complete, no tempered gems2 people · 6 points · first shared 2013 · discussion on HN
- 7The Implications of Crypto Rewards on Rubygems.org2 people · 5 points · first shared 2024 · discussion on HN
- 8RubyGems.org 2016 Push2 people · 4 points · first shared 2016 · discussion on HN
- 9February 2024 RubyGems Updates2 people · 4 points · first shared 2024 · discussion on HN
- 10Trusted Publishing on Rubygems.org2 people · 3 points · first shared 2023 · discussion on HN
- 11Multiple CVEs Released for RubyGems2 people · 3 points · first shared 2019 · discussion on HN
- 12Update on Malicious Gems Removal2 people · 2 points · first shared 2025 · discussion on HN
- 13RubyGems advisory: Possible leak of legacy API keys via improper cache config2 people · 2 points · first shared 2026 · 1 comments on HN
- 14Cooldown Support for Ruby Bundler2 people · 1 points · first shared 2026 · discussion on HN
- 15Making popular Ruby packages more secure1 people · 189 points · first shared 2022 · 45 comments on HN
What HN people wrote when they linked it
baggy_trough · 2026-07-31
There are a lot of bug fixes and changes happening. Even a very useful feature (cooldowns). See https://blog.rubygems.org
As a user, I have no complaints. Quite the opposite; I've been impressed by how well he is doing with it.
shevy-java · 2026-04-15
"Open Source Isn't Dead."
Well ...
Open Source as such will never "die", but we only need to look at what happened in, say, the last 5 or 10 years. Private entities with a commercial interest, have been flexing their muscles. Microsoft - also known as Microslop these days - with Github is probably the most famous example still, but you can see other examples. One that annoys me personally is Shopify's recent influence - rubygems.org is basically just shopifygems.org now. See: https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/04/15/rubygems-org-has-a-public-roadmap…
"Contributors from both the RubyGems client team and Shopify are already working with us on making native gems a better experience for the Ruby community. "
There is a lot more I could add to this (see my complaint about how rubygems.org hijacks gems past the 100.000 download barrier; this was why I retired from using rubygems.org, and then the year afterwards ruby core purged numerous developers. The handwriting is soooooo clear that shopify flexed their muscles here).
I think we need to make open source development more accessible to everyone, not just corporations throwing their money to gain influence and leverage. I don't have a great idea to make this model work; economic incentives kind of have to be there too, I get that part, and I am not sure which models could work. But right now we really have a big problem. We can also see this with age sniffing (age verification - see the article that pointed at Meta at…
_joel · 2026-08-14
Checksumming the dependencies in the Gemfile may help. https://blog.rubygems.org/2024/12/19/bundler-v2-6.html
rottenorange542 · 2026-07-23
Looks like the rubygems api was leaking users api keys due to some cache vulnerability.
They did a write up alongside the org that found it:
https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/07/22/security-advisory-legacy-api-key-…
https://trufflesecurity.com/blog/rubygems-cache-vulnerability
alwillis · 2026-06-12
Just a FYI: Bundler now supports cooldown [1].
[1]: "Cool down before you install: give new gems a few days to be vetted" - https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/06/03/cooldown-let-new-gems-be-vetted.h…
sdwolfz · 2025-12-09
Related link to the version 4.0.0 release/upgrade notes:
https://blog.rubygems.org/2025/12/03/upgrade-to-rubygems-bundler-4.htm…
"Bundler includes checksums in new lockfiles by default" is the thing I'm most excited about. You still need to enable them manually in existing ones though with "bundle lock --add-checksums"
mijoharas · 2025-10-06
I think I basically agree with this, but my thoughts are more on which org is better placed now to respond to things like the recent supply chain attacks (ref for the specific recent ruby one[0][1]).
I'm unsure on who is better placed to handle that stuff now. My view is that the people that were doing that are now with gem.coop, but rubygems still has the infra (i.e. you'd email [email protected] still for now).
I'm unsure about what to think about longer term (my personal approach is currently "wait and see").
Similarly, I'm perfectly happy with bundler for now, but if `rv` turns out to be like `uv`, I'd happily switch (drop-in replacement, but faster/some better features).
[0] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/60-malicious-ruby-gems-…
[1] https://blog.rubygems.org/2025/08/08/malicious-gems-removal.html
nevinera · 2025-09-19
I think you're right, but I suspect the root here is one of legal liability - if rubycentral is operating as a nonprofit that hosts _a recurring attack vector on other companies_, they'll have legal obligations to secure that service against those attacks. I assume they are continuously deploying out of that repository, and took the simplest route to controlling the attack vectors?
I'm not sure how anyone familiar with open-source communities would fail to predict the backlash though. They really should have forked the repository and switched the deployments over to their downstream fork (if I'm right about the root cause here).
(I'm mostly thinking in terms of supply-chain attacks, like this one: https://blog.rubygems.org/2025/08/25/rubygems-security-response.html)
judofyr · 2021-03-24
https://blog.rubygems.org/2015/04/13/permadelete-on-yank.html
Summary: Before 2015 then yanking didn't delete anything, but you could contact support to have it removed. They ended up getting tons of support requests and therefore changed it to be permadelete.
raesene6 · 2017-09-15
So, apologies for being a bit cynical here, but I don't see this one being addressed any time soon.
it's been at least 5 years since npm started getting scrutiny relating to security weaknesses https://blog.andyet.com/2012/03/08/compromising-the-integrity-of-the-n…
and 4 years since Rubygems was compromised http://blog.rubygems.org/2013/01/31/data-verification.html
and yet, I don't see substantial movements relating to package security and trustability in these repo's. To be clear I'm not suggesting these two are any worse than others, they're just large repo's who have had incidents in the past.
The problem here (to my view) is that increasing the security of package repo's will slow down releases (additional checks take time) and cost money (additional security, hosting etc) and until there's a market demand for those service, they won't happen.
riffraff · 2016-05-06
the problem with saying "users should not publish their ssh keys" is that they will still do it and ping you with requests to remove them even if you have said it's not possible to do it, causing unnecessary support work.
That is, AFAIU, the reason the rubygems.org maintainers allow it now.
http://blog.rubygems.org/2015/04/13/permadelete-on-yank.html
waffle_ss · 2016-05-05
> You can yank a version, which tells Cargo not to allow any projects to form new dependencies on that version, but the version isn't actually deleted
That's how RubyGems used to work, except you could contact the support team and ask them to permanently delete your gem version if something really sensitive and irrevocable was put into it. They had to change that due to their support log getting too big: http://blog.rubygems.org/2015/04/13/permadelete-on-yank.html